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A Critical Comment on California's
Droit de Suite, Civil Code Section 986
By STEPHEN S. ASHLEY*
Upon hearing sad stories of the plight of artists whose early
works sold for fortunes while the artists froze and starved in Paris
garrets and their heirs sold flowers in the streets,1 the French par-
liament in 1920 created le droit de suite, the right of an artist or of
his heirs to collect a percentage of the price of each of his works
on each subsequent resale. 2  Germany and Italy followed suit.3
American lawmakers, unlike their continental counterparts, for long
remained indifferent to the artist's lot. In September 1976, how-
ever, the governor of California came to the apparent rescue of lo-
cal artists by signing a bill enacting the first American droit de suite
statute.4  The statute, codified as section 986 of the California Civil
Code,5 provides that when a work of art sells for more than $1,000
the seller must pay the artist five percent of the sales price.
* A.B., 1973, Stanford University; J.D., 1976, Hastings College of the Law.
Member, California Bar.
1. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Under-
privileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 ASCAP CopyBcsrT L. SYlw. 1, 2-3
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Hauser].
2. Law of May 20, 1920, as amended by Copyright Act of 1957, Law of March
11, 1957, art. 42, [1957] Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] 2723,
[1957] Bulletin L6gislatif Dalloz [B.L.D.] 197.
3. See Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case
of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE LJ. 1333 (1968) (citing Copyright Act of 1965, art.
26 (W. Ger.) and Copyright Law No. 633 (Apr. 22, 1942), art. 144-55 (Italy)) [here-
inafter cited as Price].
4. Ch. 1228, § 1, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5392-93 (West) (codified as CAL. Crv.
CODE § 986)).
5. CAL. Civ. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1977). The statute reads as follows:
SECTION 1(a) Whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in
California or the sale takes place in California, the seller or his agent shall pay to
the artist of such work of fine art or to such artist's agent 5 percent of the amount
of such sale. The right of the artist to receive an amount equal to 5 percent of the
amount of such sale is not transferable and may be waived only by a contract in
writing providing for an amount in excess of 5 percent of the amount of such sale.
(1) When a work of art is sold at an auction or by a gallery, dealer, broker,
museum, or other person acting as the agent for the seller the agent shall with-
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hold 5 percent of the amount of the sale, locate the artist and pay the artist.
(2) If the seller or agent is unable to locate and pay the artist within 90
days, an amount equal to 5 percent of the amount of the sale shall be transferred
to the Arts Council.
(3) If a seller or his agent fails to pay an artist the amount equal to 5
percent of the sale of a work of fine art by the artist or fails to transfer such
amount to the Arts Council, the artist may bring an action for damages within
three years after the date of sale or one year after the discovery of the sale, which-
ever is longer.
(4) Moneys received by the council pursuant to this section shall be de-
posited in an account in the Special Deposit Fund in the State Treasury.
(5) The Arts Council shall attempt to locate any artist for whom money
is received pursuant to this section. If the council is unable to locate the artist
and the artist does not file a written claim for the money received by the council
within seven years of the date of sale of the work of fine art, the right of the
artist terminates and such money shall be transferred to the operating fund of
the council as reimbursement to fund programs of the council.
(6) Any amounts of money held by any seller or agent for the payment
of artists pursuant to this section shall be exempt from attachment or execution
of judgment by the creditors of such seller or agent.
(b) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to any of the following:
(1) To the initial sale of a work of fine art where legal title to such work
at the time of such initial sale is vested in the artist thereof.
(2) To the resale of a work of fine art for a gross sales price of less than
one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(3) To a resale after the death of such artist.
(4) To the resale of the work of fine art for a gross sales price less than
the purchase price paid by the seller.
(5) To a transfer of a work of fine art which is exchanged for one or more
works of fine art or for a combination of cash, other property, and one or more
works of fine art where the fair market value of the property exchanged is less
than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(c) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) "Artist" means the person who creates a work of fine art.
(2) "Fine art" means an original painting, sculpture, or drawing.
(d) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1977, and shall apply to
works of fine art created before and after its operative date.
(e) If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid for any reason, such invalidity shall not affect any
other provisions or applications of this section which can be effected, without
the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section
are severable.
SECTION 2. The rights of an artist of a work of fine art to receive payment
of an amount equal to 5 percent of the amount of a sale of fine art within the pro-
visions of Section 986 shall be vested at the time of such sale; except that an artist
shall have no rights to any payment pursuant to this act, if any provision therein is
subsequently repealed so as to remove the provisions for such payment, as to any
sale which occurs subsequent to such repeal; and except that, in the event any pro-
vision in this act is otherwise subsequently amended or changed, an artist shall have
only those rights to payment provided for by such subsequent amendment or change
and shall have no rights to any payment pursuant to this act, as to any sale which
occurs subsequent to such amendment or change.
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This statute will produce windfall benefits to California artists
who sold art works before the statute became a serious possibility
because the legislature decreed that the statute would apply to the
resale of works of art created and sold before its operative date,
January 1, 1977.6 To the extent that it is effective, however, the
statute will make other California artists worse off by rendering their
works less marketable. Its effectiveness is doubtful though because
the statute contains numerous loopholes that allow art dealers easily
to avoid paying artists a share of the proceeds. 7 Consequently it
may only slightly dampen the primary market in the works of living
artists. The statute's real danger and possibly lasting consequence
is that it may lull the legislators into believing that by enacting Civil
Code section 986 they have effectively served the needs of artists.
Unfortunately, California's droit de suite statute will not accom-
plish the legislature's laudable goal of aiding California artists.
Droit de Suite Legislation Generally
A majority of art patrons, in all probability, buy art primarily
to enjoy its aesthetic features rather than to speculate on the artist's
rising reputation,8 but such art purchasers must participate in a
marketplace that includes buyers who purchase art solely because
of its inv estment value. The art dealer or speculator has a finite
amount of money available for investment, and his decision to invest
will be influenced by the price and his judgment concerning the
probability of an increase or decrease in the market value of his
purchase. If two works share the same price and, in his judgment,
the same potential for appreciation in value, the art investor theo-
retically will be as willing to purchase the one as the other. If,
however, one piece is subject to droit de suite legislation, the factors
influencing the dealer's decision are no longer the same for each
piece and his decision, as well as the actions of the selling artist,
will be affected accordingly.
Market Impact and the Artist's Forced Investment
Suppose that one piece, a Madonna by artist X, is for sale in
state A and that another, a still life by artist Y, is for sale in state B.
The asking price is the same for each and the prospective buyer
considers them equally valuable investments. A statute has just
6. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 986(1)(d).
7. See notes 30-32 & accompanying text infra.
8. Price, supra note 3, at 1351.
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been enacted in state B requiring the art buyer to pay Y $100 if he
purchases Y's still life for $1,000 and later sells it for $2,000, the
price that the buyer expects both works to reach at some time in
the future. In such circumstances the buyer would no longer be
as willing to purchase the still life as the Madonna. Indeed, artist
Y would have to allow the buyer a discount on the still life in order
to lure him away from the Madonna.
Artists, however, generally do not realize that the droit de suite
statutes have an effect on the original market price of the works
they sell in that they will have to discount their offering prices in
order to compete with artists living in jurisdictions without droit de
suite legislation.9 Although this result is often unforeseen, ample
evidence of the debilitating effect of a droit de suite statute comes
from the source, France. There, the Commissaires-Priseurs acknowl-
edged that the droit de suite had jeopardized France's position in the
international art market. They proposed decreasing the share of the
artists' heirs under the French statute or encouraging other countries
to adopt equally burdensome droit de suite legislation.10
To the extent of the discount that Y had to offer the buyer in
the above example, state B's droit de suite statute makes Y an invol-
untary investor in his own work. If, in their effort to assist Y and
as an alternative to this forced investment, the B legislators were to
hand Y the amount of the discount and offer him the opportunity
to spend the money currently to buy groceries and pay rent or to
invest the money either in a savings account or in a highly specu-
lative venture, such as a five percent interest in one of his own paint-
ings, Y's response would depend on his present financial condition.
If he is the penniless victim of popular imagination, he would prob-
ably buy food and shelter. If he is more comfortable, he might put
the money into some safe investment, such as a savings account.
Only if Y's wealth belies his popular image would he take a chance
on such a risky investment as a painting by a living artist. Lacking
these alternatives, Y would probably say that the legislature's de-
cision to force him to invest in his own paintings made him worse
9. Only if the forced discount were visible to the artist would he realize that
he is not being exploited when he does not share in the proceeds from the resale of
one of his early works that has soared in value. It is evident that artists presently
feel outraged when an early work sells for many times the original price and they fail
to share in the gain.
10. DOSSIER DE LA CHAmBRE NATIONALE DES COMvnssAn1Es-PRIsEtmS SUR LE
DROIT DE SurrE AUX AaRnsTs (1964), discussed in Price, supra note 3, at 1334 n.7,
1349-50 nn.47-48.
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off because it precludes consideration of Y's present financial condi-
tion. The nature and absurdity of a legislated mandatory invest-
ment would be evident to all if state B had passed a statute prohib-
iting Y from selling every twentieth painting for twenty years or
until the prices of the paintings doubled. If Y had wanted to ac-
quire a five percent interest in his own future reputation, he could
simply have put every twentieth painting he produced in his closet.
The Droit de Suite Interest as a Contract Term
Writers have noted that artists might, by contract, bargain for
a term nearly equivalent to a droit de suite interest,"' and the writers
have often attributed the artists' failure to do so to ignorance of their
legal rights.12  Such lack of knowledge in a bargaining situation rep-
resents a transaction cost that prevents those exchanges from taking
place that would otherwise occur if such a cost were not present.
If artists' failure to bargain to retain special rights in their work is
the result of their ignorance of this possibility, the legislature could
provide a service by filling in this gap.13 If the legislature could
determine that artists and their patrons would customarily agree to
a droit de suite were it not for their ignorance of the legal possibility
of such an arrangement, then they would serve the artists and their
patrons by implying into every contract for the sale of fine art the
droit de suite term the parties would have included if they had been
aware of the possibility.
Not all artists would choose to give a discount in exchange for
a droit de suite term, even if the artist and the dealer knew of that
possibility. A statute implying a droit de suite into every art sale
would, as pointed out, make such an artist an involuntary investor
in his own future reputation. Thus, it would make sense for a droit
de suite statute to permit the artist to waive the right and use for
immediate needs the discount the market would otherwise force him
to exchange for it. Reflecting the view that artists lack the good
sense to manage their own affairs, the droit de suite statutes typically
forbid waiver or alienation of the right.' 4
11. Price, supra note 3, at 1363. Apparently a growing number of artists are
bargaining for droit de suite terms in their sales contracts. Hochfield, ArtistZ Rights:
Pros and Cons, ARTN-ws, May 1975, at 20, 24.
12. See Price, supra note 3, at 1358, 1363.
13. See B. PosNER, ECONoMuc ANALYSIS OF LAW 18 (1972) (proposed solution
to conflicting property interests).
14. Hauser, supra note 1, at 13; Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit
de Suite and a Proposed Enactment for the United States, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 19, at 22
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There are several reasons why informed artists would reject a
legislature's paternalistic attitude represented by a compulsory droit
de suite and insist instead upon the ability to waive such a term im-
plied into their sales contracts. First, the droit de suite rewards an
artist only if his work is frequently resold. It rewards the artist for
later recognition of his accomplishment only to the extent that fre-
quency of resale is a function of the increase in market value. A
worthless painting will not enjoy frequent resales, but a priceless
painting may likewise remain in one owner's hands indefinitely be-
cause the resale market in contemporary art is not large and many
works typically pass by inheritance or from private collections into
museums. 15 Likewise, the recent trend toward art works of monu-
mental size excludes an increasing number of artists from the po-
tential benefits of a droit de suite; such objects, often immovable,
rarely change owners.16
The droit de suite extends protection to the works of only a nar-
row set of artists: those whose art both increases in value during the
artist's lifetime and experiences frequent resale. As one unnamed
observer of the art marketplace commented, "There are less than
100 living artists who have a secondary market . . . but legislation
like this makes people unwilling to buy the work of any living artist.
So who's helped? Does Chagall need the money? The law helps
those who least need help at the expense of those who do."' 7  In
1968 Professor Price surveyed the Art Prices Annual and estimated
that a droit de suite for living artists would benefit no more than
about fifteen percent of the artists whose works were sold that year
& n.15 (citing M. DUCHEMIN, LE DROIT DE SUITE DES ARTISTES 30 (1948)) [herein-
after cited as Schulder].
Professor Price's description of the droit de suite sheds light on this limitation on
alienation: "The droit de suite evolved from a particular conception of art, the artist,
and the way art is sold. At its core is a vision of the starving artist, with his genius
unappreciated, using his last pennies to purchase canvas and pigments which he turns
into a misunderstood masterpiece. The painting is sold for a pittance, probably to
buy medicine for a tubercular wife. The purchaser is a canny investor who travels
about artists' hovels trying to pick up bargains which he will later turn into large
amounts of cash. Thirty years later the artist is still without funds and his children
are in rags; meanwhile his paintings, now the subject of a Museum of Modern Art
retrospective and a Harry Abrams parlor-table book, fetch small fortunes at Parke-
Bernet and Christie's .... The droit de suite is La Bohme and Lust for Life reduced
to statutory form." Price, supra note 3, at 1335 (footnote omitted).
15. Price, supra note 3, at 1351.
16. Id. at 1341.
17. TiH ARTNEWSLETTER, Oct. 26, 1976, at 3.
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and that a droit de suite whose protection survived the artist by fifty
years would raise the figure to no more than thirty-five percent.'8
The second reason why an artist might not seek a droit de suite
term concerns the way art is sold in the United States. Auctions
play an unimportant role in the resale of art in the United States.19
Enforcement of a droit de suite depends upon an artist's ability to
know when his work has been resold, and sales other than at public
auctions would be difficult to verify.2o Consequently, an artist would
likely be unwilling to give a purchaser much of a discount in ex-
change for a term that may be of no practical value to him.
Third, an artist desiring the protection of a droit de suite could
achieve the same result by far less complicated means. As mentioned
above, the artist could put every twentieth painting in the closet and
wait for his talent to be discovered. Once discovered, he could imi-
tate art from his most successful period or he could sell preparatory
drawings or models.
2 '
There are artists who are aware of the possibility of bargaining
for a droit de suite term and do not need the legislature to imply
such a term into their sales contracts. If they should choose to bar-
gain for such a term a different problem arises. In any state having
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, an artist would have a diffi-
cult time agreeing with his dealer on a droit de suite term that would
encompass later purchasers of his art. If the artist sold or consigned
his work to a solvent dealer willing to acquiesce in a droit de suite
term, the two could agree that the dealer would pay the artist a
percentage of the purchase price on the occasion of each later resale
of the painting. If the dealer's continued solvency is questionable,
the artist might want to bind later purchasers to the droit de suite
term but is prevented from doing so under the rules of the UCC. By
18. Price, supra note 3, at 1349. The Art Dealers Association estimates that there
are only fifty living artists with a resale market. Hochfield, Legislating Royalties for
Artists, ARTN-vs, Dec. 1976, at 52 [hereinafter cited as Hochfield].
19. Price, supra note 3, at 1342.
20. The original French statute applied only to public auctions; the law was not
amended to cover private sales until 1957. Copyright Act of 1957, Law of March
11, 1957, art. 42, [1957] J.O. 2723, [1957] B.L.D. 197 (amending Law of May 20,
1920). A decade after the amendment no droit de suite proceeds were collected from
private sales because the art dealers persuaded M. Malraux, then Minister of Cul-
tural Affairs, not to sign needed regulations. Schulder, supra note 14, at 34 (citing an
interview with the Secretary General of the French Union of Artistic Property, in
Paris, Aug. 9, 1964); see Price, supra note 3, at 1333 n.1.
21. Price, supra note 3, at 1340. Picasso is reported to have signed a napkin
and given it to a poor friend, urging her not to sell it too cheaply. S. Bunsmu, THE
ARr Cown 87 (1973).
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entrusting his art to the dealer, the artist would give the dealer the
power to transfer all the artist's rights to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business. 22  Even though the artist had retained a security
interest in his art as a circuitous route to a droit de suite this interest
would not survive a sale by the dealer to a later purchaser.23  A
legislature would perform a useful service if it would create some
legal mechanism that would allow the artist to reserve special in-
terests in his art by putting later purchasers on notice that the artist
has reserved these interests.
24
The California Statute
California's droit de suite legislation is subject to the criticism
that can be levelled against all legislation of this kind. In addition,
because it will place the California art marketplace at a competitive
disadvantage in relation to the markets in other states, it has the po-
tential to disrupt the relationship that exists between California art-
ists and their dealers as well as the relationship that exists among
the dealers themselves. The statute does, however, contain loop-
holes that may blunt its impact on these relationships and the Cali-
fornia art market generally. The result in either case will be un-
fortunate because the statute, despite its loopholes, will be expensive
to administer.
Impact on Relationships in the Art Market
Art dealers typically support undiscovered artists by agreeing
to buy their work created early in the artists' careers. 25  The dealers
assume the risk that the artists may not succeed, and the risk is great.
The Art Dealers Association estimates that 99 percent of the art
works produced now decrease in value. 26  If the artist becomes fa-
mous, the dealer collects his compensation for bearing the risk on
all the works when he resells appreciated art at a handsome profit.
If the state imposes a five percent surcharge on resales, dealers real-
ize that the system by which young artists have been supported until
22. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
23. U.C.C. § 9-307(1); see generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 25-12 to 15 (1972).
24. One possibility is the creation of an art registry. Such a registry might also
help protect purchasers from forgeries. See Du Boff, Controlling the Artful Con:
Authentication and Regulation, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 973, 1016-18 (1976); Schulder, supra
note 14.
25. Hochfield, supra note 18, at 52.
26. Id.
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they receive public recognition is jeopardized. Because a droit de
suite has been adopted only in California, other states with active
art marketplaces will benefit at the expense of California art dealers.
Purchasers will be able to buy the work of a living artist elsewhere
and avoid the surcharge imposed by the droit de suite.27  According
to a leading art magazine, "[T]hose who are most familiar with the
California art market are unanimous in their opinion of [new section
986 of the California Civil Code]; they think it is a disaster."28  Cur-
rent practices among art dealers will also be affected. Dealers some-
times agree among themselves to display the works of artists repre-
sented by other dealers. These agreements usually provide that the
dealer who displays the work of an artist outside his fold will buy
some of the paintings from the artist's sponsoring dealer if he cannot
sell a certain minimum. Lending agreements of this kind expose
an artist's work to a wider audience and increase his chances for suc-
cess. A droit de suite statute discourages these agreements because
the dealer who displays the work is forced to buy unsold paintings
if he fails to sell the agreed minimum. The statute will compel the
dealer to pay to the artist the statutory percentage. 29
Efficaciousness of the Statute
California's droit de suite has the potential to cause the dam-
aging results described above. Its impact may be minimal, however,
because of the statutory scheme itself and the potential for abuse.
Under the statute, an artist must bring an action within three years
after the date of sale or one year after the discovery of the sale,
whichever is later.30 The statute does not apply to resales for less
than $1,000 or for less than the amount the seller paid for the art
work. Furthermore, it does not apply to resales after the artist's
death.3' Art owners can dispose of their art through long term
leases with purchase options that can be exercised after the artist
dies.
27. A California dealer explained the situation succinctly: "We supported
William T. Wiley for six years until he caught on. In these early days, we had a
devil of a time selling him. Now, why should anyone buy a Wiley from us when
they can buy it in New York?" Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 986(1)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
31. Id. § 986(1) (b) (2)-(3). Amending legislation has been introduced by State
Senator Sieroty, author of the droit de suite statute, which would create additional ex-
ceptions to the application of the statute. The amendment provides that § 986(a)
shall not apply to any of the following transactions: "To the resale of a work of fine
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The legislature limited the application of section 986 to trans-
actions in which the seller resides in California or the sale takes place
in California.3 2  Clever dealers can devise a host of ways to avoid
the statute by means of its choice of law provision. For example,
non-California dealers can remove the art to New York for sale. A
California art dealer who has found someone willing to pay a high
price for the work of a living artist can sell the art to a dummy Del-
aware corporation for less than the original purchase price and then
consummate the sale outside California.
The California statute applies expressly to sales both at public
auction and in private. Auctions play a minor role in the secondary
art market in America, however, so that most of the sales to which
the California statute applies will take place in private. Because the
statute imposes no penalty on sellers who keep resales secret, the
art owners will have little incentive not to conceal the fact of resale
from the artist. For example, a California artist may discover that
a subsequent California purchaser of his art has resold the art at the
previous purchase price, $1,000, to a dummy Delaware corporation,
which has resold the work in New York for $100,000 to another dum-
my Delaware corporation owned by a California art collector, who
has brought the art back to California. In order to recover his share
of the proceeds, only $5,000, the artist has to persuade an attorney
to bring a lawsuit, the success of which would depend on the lawyer's
persuading a court to pierce the veils of the Delaware corporations
in order to reveal the sham transaction for what it is, a sale by a Cali-
fornia resident. Furthermore, the artist must both realize he has a
claim and find someone to take his case, all within a year of discover-
ing the sale. In these circumstances the artist has neither a realistic
chance of recovering his $5,000 nor much incentive to pursue the
process.
33
art by an art dealer to a purchaser within two years of the initial sale of the work
of fine art by the artist to an art dealer, provided all intervening resales are between
art dealers, [and] [t]o the resale of a work of fine art where such resale is merely
incidental to the sale of either a newly constructed building for which the work of
fine art was commissioned or purchased to be an integral part thereof or an existing
building of which the work of fine art was subsequently commissioned or purchased
to become an integral part thereof." S.B. 707 (1977).
32. CAL. CrV. CODE § 986(1)(a) (West Supp. 1977).
33. Amending legislation introduced by State Senator Sieroty "would permit the
prevailing party in an action to recover unpaid royalties to recover costs and attorney's
fees and, where the seller or his agent has intentionally avoided payment of such
royalties, would permit the artist to recover, punitive damages not to exceed $500."
S.B. 707 (1977).
[Vol. 9
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Even if the statute will be ineffective because of its loopholes,
section 986 will be a costly affair. The California Department of
Finance estimated that in its first year of operation the statute will
cost the state $236,000 to administer; the cost thereafter is expected
to be $176,000 per year.
34
Choice of Law Provision
The legislature, by limiting section 986 to sales that take place
in California or that are made by a California resident,35 has effective-
ly mandated a choice of law provision that will have uniquely un-
desirable consequences. First, as noted before, this provision is un-
derinclusive and will allow art dealers to avoid the statute by remov-
ing art from the state prior to sale.36 In addition, the choice of law
provision is overinclusive to the extent that it will impose California's
five percent surcharge on transactions to which a California court,
guided by its usual interest analysis choice of law rules,37 would not
otherwise apply California law. This result is illustrafed by the fol-
lowing example.
Suppose a New York resident goes to California with his paint-
ing by a New York artist and while there sells it to a New York resi-
dent at a profit. The New York artist sues in California for his share.
If the scope of section 986 had not been expressly made applicable
to sales in California or sales by California residents, a California
court would have to decide whether to apply the California statute
or New York law, which makes no provisions for a droit de suite.
The California court would probably reason that the California stat-
ute advances the state's interest in giving special compensation to
California artists. New York's failure to provide for a droit de suite
advances its interest in rendering art purchases by New York residents
fully marketable on resale. The application of New York law would
advance New York's interest in protecting New York art patrons be-
cause the buyer and the seller are both New York residents. The
application of California law would not advance California's interest
in compensating its artists because the artist is also a New York resi-
dent. Thus, the California court's application of California's interest
34. Hochfield, supra note 18, at 52, 54.
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(1)(a) (West Supp. 1977).
36. See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
37. See Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 128 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974).
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analysis choice of law rules would not apply a California droit de
suite statute to the transaction described above.
Unless California courts temper section 986 by invoking Cali-
fornia's modern choice of law rules despite the statute's clear man-
date that it be applied to all sales by California residents and to all
sales in California, section 986 will capriciously impose a tax on trans-
actions in which California has no real interest. If the California
courts do superimpose a choice of law rule on section 986, however,
they will virtually amend it to provide that the statute applies "when-
ever a work of fine art by a California artist is sold in California or
the seller resides in California."
Conclusion
If the California legislature had determined that artists and their
patrons would routinely agree to droit de suite terms if such terms
were legally enforceable and if the parties were aware of the possi-
bility of such terms, the legislature would have done the art com-
munity a service by inserting a waivable droit de suite term into
every art sale contract. The legislature overlooked the interests of
those buyers and sellers who might not choose such an agreement
by failing to leave open the possibility of waiver or alienation of the
statutory droit de suite. Thus, the statute produces windfall bene-
fits to the limited number of artists with secondary resale markets
at the expense of less successful living artists. Furthermore, the
legislature is now unlikely to enact other legislation that would help
all California artists. Therefore, the California statute will leave
most artists worse off than if no action had been taken.
Unfortunately, the effects of a droit de suite statute will not be
immediately apparent to most artists. Consequently, only the deal-
ers will have a sufficiently strong interest to wage a campaign against
the statute.3 Hopefully, the art dealers will be able to achieve the
statute's repeal, and other legislatures will not imitate California's
action in enacting a droit de suite. When Governor Brown signed
the California statute, he scrawled across the bill, "What hath Art
wrought?" 39  It is unfortunate that he did not write "vetoed" instead.
38. Art dealers in southern California are reported to be planning a lawsuit seek-
ing to enjoin the enforcement of section 986. Hochfield, supra note 18, at 52.
39. Id.; THE ARTNEWSLETTER, Oct. 26, 1976, at 2.
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